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Abstract
Although economically very important, local-service sectors have received little attention in the extensive literature on competitive inter-
actions. Detailed data gathering in these sectors is hard, not only because of the multitude of local players, but also because key service dimensions
are hard to quantify. Using empirical entry models in the tradition of Bresnahan and Reiss [Bresnahan, T.F., and Reiss, P.C. (1990). Entry in
monopoly markets. Review of Economic Studies, 57 (192), 531–553, Bresnahan, T.F., and Reiss, P.C. (1991). Entry and competition in
concentrated markets. Journal of Political Economy, 99 (5), 977–1009], we infer information on these sectors' degree of competition from the
observed entry decisions in different local markets.
We apply the empirical entry model to the video-rental market. Additional entries of video stores are found to significantly increase the level of
competition. This occurs not only when a second player enters the market, but also in markets already characterized by two or more incumbents.
Unlike the predictions of many economic models, we find this increase to be larger when the entry occurs in a duopoly than in a monopoly.
Several control variables included in the model offer additional insights. As such, we find evidence of cannibalization from the upstream
channel (movie theatres), but not from the downstream channel (premium cable). In addition, various socio-demographic characteristics of the
trading zone, such as income and household size, are found to also have a significant impact on store performance.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, marketing researchers have concentrated on
consumer response to marketing decision variables. Recently,
increasing attention has been devoted to the behavior of compe-
titors in the marketplace, as reflected in special issues on
competition in the International Journal of Research in Marketing
(2001) and Marketing Science (2005). Many of the empirical
applicationsinthearea,however,dealwithfast-movingconsumer
goods(e.g.Leeflang&Wittink,1996),thecarmarket(e.g.Sudhir,
2001) and the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Shankar, 1997). Not
surprisingly, these are sectors where detailed information on
performance and support variables tends to be available.
1
Inservice sectors such asthe hotel,restaurantandvideo-rental
industry, however, it is difficult to collect data on the different
marketing and/or performance variables of all players in the
market. Firms inthese sectors typically compete inlocal markets,
as customers need local contact with the service provider
(Fuentelsaz,Gomez,&Polo,2002).Theseso-calledlocal-service
sectors are economically very important. For example, in 2001,
the US and UK hotel and restaurant sector contributed
respectively 1% ($88.4 billion dollar) and 3% (£29 billion) to
Total Gross Value Added (United Nations Statistics).
Certain characteristics of local-service sectors inhibit the
application of traditional methods that have been used to make
inferences on the competitive structure of a market, such as
Granger-Causality tests (e.g. Leeflang & Wittink, 1996), the
Conjectural Variations approach (e.g. Kim & Parker, 1999), and
the Non-Nested Model Comparisons approach (e.g. Kadiyali,
Chintagunta, & Vilcassim, 2000). Two key inhibiting factors are
(i) the large number of local players, and (ii) the existence of
difficult-to-observe decision variables.
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local players. The UK hotel sector, for example, consists of
more than 40,000 establishments, while Germany (France) has
around 38,000 (20,000) hotels (Eurostat). As customers expect
local contact with the firm, operating in a geographical market
necessitates in-market facilities from which to deliver the
service (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002). Gathering detailed data on all
individual market participants is nearly impossible.
Second, firms in service sectors not only compete on the basis
of readily observable tactical marketing variables, but also on a
numberofother,lessdirectlyobservable,factorssuchaspersonal
interactions with employees and the physical surroundings. Even
though measurement scales have been developed to operationa-
lize these components (see e.g. SERVQUAL in Parasuraman,
Zeithaml, & Berry, 1988), it quickly becomes impossible to ob-
tain the relevant measures for all players in the market.
Because of these characteristics of many local-service sec-
tors, we advocate the use of another approach to make compet-
itive inferences that has less stringent data requirements. The
general idea, first introduced in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,
1991), is to infer information on the degree of competition from
the observed entry decisions, and its relationship with local
market size and other market characteristics. Hence, to draw
inferences on the degree of competition, it is not necessary
to observe individual firms' profits. Intuitively, the empirical
framework studies by how much the local market size should
increase to sustain an additional entrant. If the required market
size increase is large, this implies that an additional entrant leads
to a strong increase in competition.
We illustrate the proposed framework in the context of the
Belgian video-rental industry. We find that competition increases
with every entry in the market, as is also the case in Seim's (in
press) study of the US video-rental market. Unlike Asplund and
Sandin(1999) andBresnahanandReiss(1991),however,we find
that competition still increases upon the third and fourth entrance.
Furthermore,contrarytothepredictionofmosteconomictheories,
our results indicate that the increase in the level of competition is
largestwhenentryoccursinaduopoly.Ouranalysesfurtherreveal
thatalsoanothertypeofcompetitiondeterminestheattractiveness
of a video store's trading zone, i.e. the competition arising from
potential substitute channels. Specifically, we find a negative
effect for the presence of a movie theatre (an upstream channel),
while no such effect is found for premium cable (a downward
channel). Moreover, several socio-demographic characteristics as
average income and household size, are found to also influence
video store profitability.
2. Model development
Following Fok and Franses (2004), entry models can broadly
be divided into two types of approaches: (i) noncooperative
game-theoretic models, and (ii) non-structural empirical models
estimated on time-series or panel data. The first set of studies
takes a normative viewpoint, and prescribes how firms should
respondinanoptimalwaytolaterentrants.Empiricalsupportfor
these models, however, is often quite limited or completely
absent. The second type of research, in contrast, is more data
driven, and explicitly based on observed market situations.
However, these studies are mostly non-structural in nature, and
therefore less suited for comparing and testing alternative




a particular market as long as this is profitable. Following
BresnahanandReiss(1990,1991),westudythelong-termeffect
of entry on competition starting from a long-term free entry
equilibrium condition. Based on this premise, the observed
number of players allows one to infer bounds on the profitability
in each local market, and one can use the cross-sectional
variation in the number of players in different local markets to
empirically derive what market size is required, on average, to
support a given number of players. Hence, rather than analyzing
the over-time variation in performance as the number of firms
within a given market changes, we compare the number of firms
present across a sample of different markets at a given time.
Because of the long-term free entry equilibrium assumption,
one can infer the profitability in each local market from the
observed number of firms and its relation with observed market
characteristics. Using the estimated relationship between the
observed number of (profitable) entrants and the observed
market characteristics, one can subsequently derive entry
thresholds. An entry threshold is defined as the minimum mar-
ket size required for a given number of firms to break even, after
controlling for other observed market characteristics, in a
market. It is the population level at which the observed pro-
fitability is equal to zero. Entry thresholds provide information
on how the extent of competition changes as more firms enter
the market. Specifically, if an additional entrant provides a
strong constraint on firm profits, the entry threshold to carry that
additional firm raises more than proportionally. For example, if
the critical market size required to carry one firm consists of
1000 inhabitants and the market size to carry two firms is 3000
inhabitants, one can infer that the second firm increases the
degree of competition in that market, as the per-firm threshold
has increased. In contrast, if the market size required to support
two firms is 2000, the entry of the second firm did not affect the
level of competition, as the per-firm threshold did not change.
The evolution in the empirically-estimated thresholds can be
compared with the evolution predicted by different models of
oligopolistic competition, thereby allowing us to compare and
test alternative theories of strategic behavior.
2.1. Econometric framework
Firm profits when there are n firms in market i are given by
the latent variable Πi
n, which consists of a deterministic part
(πi
n) and a random part (εi):
Pn
i ¼ pn
i −ei : ð1Þ
The deterministic part is allowed to depend on the number of
firmsinthemarket.Therandompartrepresentsanerrortermthat
2 We refer to Fok and Franses (2004) for an extensive literature review on
both types of models.
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This error term is assumed to be unobserved to the researcher,
but observed by any player in the market. The assumption that
theerrortermiscommontoallfirmswithinamarketimpliesthat
firms aretreatedashomogeneous. Therefore, this approachdoes
not allow for firm-specific effects.
3 These assumptions give rise
to an ordered probit specification, as will be explained next.
The latent variable Πi
n is linked to the observed number of
firms through the assumption that there will be entry as long as
this is profitable. Making the weak assumption that profits
decrease as the number of firms increases, i.e. Πi
nNΠi
n+1,w e
observe a market without any players when even a monopolist
does not find it profitable to enter (i.e. Πi
1b0). Similarly, the
number of firms in the market will be equal to one if one firm
finds it profitable to enter the market (i.e. Πi
1≥0), while a
second firm would be unprofitable (i.e. Πi
2b0). Similar
conditions can be formed for all market structures n observed
in the sample (with n=1,…, K−1w i t hK the largest market
structure observed in the data). Finally, a market will contain K
players when they all find it profitable to enter (i.e. Πi
K≥0).
More formally, we can state these conditions, derived from Eq.
(1), as follows:
Ni ¼ 0i feiNp1
i
Ni ¼ n if pn
i zeiNpnþ1
i ; n ¼ 1; N ;K−1
Ni ¼ K if pK
i zei:
ð2Þ
If the market-specific errors (εi) follow a standard normal










with Φ(·) the cumulative standard normal distribution. From
these probabilities, the likelihood function can be constructed








zin; with zin ¼ 1i fNi ¼ n; ð4Þ
corresponding to the likelihood function of an ordered probit
model (Franses & Paap, 2001).
2.2. Specification
The deterministic profitability part πi
n may be modeled as a
function of market characteristics. Overall store performance has
been found to increase with local market potential and buying
power, and to vary with the level of local competition (Campo,
Gijsbrechts, Goossens, & Verhetsel, 2000). Local market
potential and buying power are influenced by characteristics of
the local trading zone, such as (i) its socio-demographic com-




could, for example, include the presence of movie theatres and/or
premium cable.
4 We add both sets of market characteristics as










is the population in market i,D E M O G R i is a vector of socio-
demographicmarketcharacteristics,SUBSTiisavectorcapturing
thepresenceofpossiblesubstitutesinmarketi,an dDi
n ave ct orof
dummy variables indicating whether the number of firms in
market i is equal to n. The parameters λ
n can be interpreted as
measuring the entry effect of the n-th firm. A positive difference
between λ
n and λ
n−1 is interpreted as evidence that entry has a
negativeimpactonperformance.Notethatthisspecificationdoes
not restrict the difference between λ
n and λ
n−1 to be constant, as
was the case in Seim's (in press) linear specification. This allows
for a more flexible pattern of how competition changes with the
entry of additional video stores.
The estimated parameters (α ˆ, β ˆ, γ ˆ, λ ˆn) provide two types of
insights. First, they have an interest in their own right, as they
allow us to test which factors have a significant impact on firm
performance.Second,theycanbeusedtoderiveentrythresholds,
i.e.theminimummarketsizesrequiredtosupportagivennumber
of firms. These thresholds offer insights on how entry affects the
extent of competition. The n-firm entry threshold (S
n) is defined




nonlinear transformation of the estimated parameters:
Sn ¼ exp −
ˆ b
P











SUBST are the covariates evaluated at
their samplemean.As discussed earlier, entry thresholds increase
disproportionally with the number of firms if entry has a




the per-firm n-firm entry threshold over the per-firm n−1e n t r y

















If the threshold ratio is above one, the extent of competition
increases with the additional entry. For example, an estimated
3 Berry (1992) uses a model that accounts for firm-specific effects. However,
his approach is only applicable in a setting where it is possible to exploit
information on the identity of the firms, for example when there is a limited
number of different players across the various markets. As this is not the case
for the sector under study, we cannot use this approach.
4 Premium-cable providers are allowed to show a movie about a year before
regular (cable) television providers (Doyle, 2002). Subscribers to this channel
pay a fixed per-month subscription rate.
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increase by 5% to support an additional firm. Note that the
threshold ratios in Eq. (7) only depend on the entry effects λ
n
and on the market size parameter α. Although they do not
directly depend on the other market characteristics, they do so
indirectly as the parameter estimates of λ
n and α may be af-
fected by their inclusion in the model.
Some additional remarks on specification (5) are in order.
First, population could, of course, be viewed as one additional
element of the vector of socio-demographic characteristics
DEMOGRi. However, we write it separately since it is used to
compute the entry thresholds, which summarize the role of
competition. Second, population enters in logarithmic form.
This ensures that the computed entry thresholds are non-
negative. In addition, the logarithmic functional form is
consistent with a specification in which the drivers of store
performance influence the ratio of variable profits over fixed
costs, as in Genesove (2004). It is therefore not necessary to
separately identify the effects of market characteristics on
variable profits versus fixed costs, which proves to be difficult
in practice.
3. Conceptual Development
In line with previous research, we argue that overall store
performance varies with (i) the level of local competition, and
(ii) market-specific characteristics.
3.1. Competition
The competitive character of the trading area may strongly
affect a store's performance. The extent of competition has
often been operationalized through concentration indices such
as the combined market share of the top players in the market or
the Herfindahl Index. In local-service industries, however,
market-share information on the various incumbents is often
unavailable (see Section 1). Other studies have used the number
of market players as a proxy for the extent of competition/
market structure (see e.g. Dhar & Hoch, 1997). However, the
assumed exogeneity of the market-structure variables in those
studies can be questioned. Market structure not only influences
conduct and performance. Conduct can, in turn, affect market
structure (Kadiyali et al., 2001). An observed market structure is
then seen as the outcome of firms' profit-maximizing decisions
that take the expected behavior and performance of incumbent
and potential players into account (Manuszak, 2002). Our
approach addresses this concern. Market structure is treated as
an endogenous variable, as determined through the zero-profit
market equilibrium. Through the evolution in the aforemen-
tioned threshold ratios, we are subsequently able to quantify
how the extent of competition changes when a new player
enters various existing market structures.
Different patterns for this evolution may be obtained. Both
the Cournot and the differentiated Bertrand model predict the
increase in competition to be largest when entry occurs in a
monopoly market. Competition will then continue to increase
with new entrants, albeit at a diminishing rate, until the market
has become perfectly competitive, i.e. until price-cost margins
have become equal to zero. According to these models,
estimated threshold ratios will be greater than one, but decrease
as more players enter the market until the market has become
perfectlycompetitive,inwhichcasetheestimatedthresholdratio
will be equal to one. In the Bertrand model with undifferentiated
products, in contrast, new entrants do not increase the extent of
competition as soon as two firms are already active (e.g. Tirole,
1988). In this model, only the first estimated threshold ratio will
be significantly larger than one. Third, in contestable markets,
the competitive effect of entry is already zero for entries into
monopoly markets. Indeed, in these markets, the threat of
potential entrants is already effective in disciplining the
incumbent firm, decreasing its price-cost margin already before
entry (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982). Actual entry will
thereforenotincreasetheextentofcompetition,implyingthatall
estimated threshold ratios for contestable markets will be equal
to one. Also in markets with sustainable collusion (e.g.
D'Aspremont & Gabszewicz, 1985), the effect of entry on the
extent of competition in the market will be zero, as long as the
entry does not cause the collusion to break down. Estimated
threshold ratios for collusive markets should thus be equal to
one.
Hence, different model assumptions lead to differing
normative implications, making the actual evolution of the
entry thresholds an empirical issue.
3.2. Market-specific characteristics
To make a more reliable assessment of the degree of
competition in a market, we add two types of market-specific
control variables that are likely to impact store performance
within a market. First, the availability of possible substitutes in
the environment may impact the perceived attractiveness of a
trading zone. Even though this is widely recognized in the
marketing literature (see e.g. Miller, Reardon, & McCorkle,
1999; Mulhern et al., 1998), this has often been ignored in the
empirical entry literature (as in e.g. Asplund & Sandin, 1999;
Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991). Seim's (in press) application to the
video-rental market, for example, only focused on competition
between video stores themselves, abstracting from the impact of
competition from up- and downward channels, such as movie
theatres and premium cable. Second, there is a growing body of
literature that shows that also the demographic composition of
the trading zone impacts a store's performance (see e.g. Campo
et al., 2000; Montgomery, 1997). We incorporate several of the
characteristics that have been identified as potential drivers of
video-rental performance in the micro-marketing literature and
industry reports.
3.2.1. Presence of substitute channels
In the movie industry, a typical release sequence starts with
the theatrical release, followed by a pay-per-view window after
4–6 months, and a home-video release after 6–9 months. A
movie, on average, becomes available through the premium-
cable channel approximately 12 months after the first theatrical
release, and through the regular television channel after another
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tions to the product may be made in the process of sequential
distribution, the main differences between the different channels
have to do with the timing and the price (Lehmann & Weinberg,
2000).
Different versions of the same product can be considered
substitutes, causing possible cannibalization from channels
upstream and downstream in the sequence. Indeed, potential
customersmayalreadyhavepurchasedtheproduct(inoursetting,
seen the movie) in an earlier channel, and subsequently leave the
market (Lehmann & Weinberg, 2000), while others may have an
incentive to postpone their purchase as they anticipate a price
decrease (Purohit, 1997). If these phenomena, which so far have
been documented at the individual product (movie) level, occur
consistently across multiple products (movies), the overall
performance of the intermediate channel (the video stores) will
be affected negatively by the presence of the upstream (movie
theatres) and downstream (premium cable) channel.
3.2.2. Socio-demographic control variables
Alsovarioussocio-demographiccharacteristicsofthetrading
zone may have an impact on the profitability of firms operating
in a given market. We control for the following characteristics:
average income and household size, the age and ethnic com-
position of the population, and the degree of urbanization of the
local market.
3.2.2.1. Income. As it has a positive impact on purchasing
power, income in a local market may have a positive effect on
the profitability of the various firms in that trading zone. On the
other hand, as high-income families are also less price sensitive
(see e.g. Hoch et al., 1995), income may cause a shift in demand
towards the more expensive channels. Vogel (2001) estimates
that watching a rented home video is approximately seven times
cheaper (per person per hour) than a movie-theatre visit, and
somewhat more expensive than watching it on premium cable.
Of course, each of these options is more expensive than
watching regular television. As video rental is neither the most
expensive nor the cheapest option, the net effect of these
opposing forces is hard to predict. In addition, wealthy people
usually have higher opportunity costs (Hoch et al., 1995), which
may influence their valuation of time and their sensitivity to
services offered within the different channels of movie
distribution.
3.2.2.2. Household size. Larger families have been found to
be more price sensitive (Hoch et al., 1995), which may affect the
share of a movie distribution channel relative to both the more
(upstream) and less (downstream) expensive channels in the
sequence, even though the net effect is again hard to predict.
Larger families may also be characterized by a higher
heterogeneity in preferences, which may translate in the
purchase of multiple products.
3.2.2.3. Age. Even though retired people have more leisure
time, they have been found to spend less on entertainment than
younger people (Vogel, 2001), and to be more price-elastic
(Hoch et al., 1995), which may affect their channel choice for
movie entertainment.
3.2.2.4. Ethnicity. Different ethnic groups have been found to
differ in their price elasticity (Hoch et al., 1995), which may (as
argued before) affect their demand for high-versus low-cost
forms of entertainment. In addition, minority groups often tend
to participate less in mainstream leisure activities because of
differences in economic resources, value systems, norms and
socialization patterns (Floyd, Shinew, McGuire, & Noe, 1994).
3.2.2.5. Urbanization. We also include the level of urbaniza-
tion as a control variable, as this has been shown to affect
shopping behavior (e.g. Campo et al., 2000).
4. Data and industry
4.1. The video-rental market
The movie industry does not only derive revenue from
theatricalexhibition,butalsofromhomevideos,premiumcable,
andothertelevisionchannels(Vogel,2001).Marketingresearch-
ers have focused almost exclusively on the movie-theatre chan-
nel (see Eliashberg, Elberse, & Leenders, in press for a review).
Recently, however, the home-video channel surpassed the
movie-theatre industry as most important source of consumer
spending on movies. In 2002, for example, US consumers spent
morethan$22billion onvideo andDVDrental($10billion)and
buying ($12 billion) compared to almost $10 billion on theatre
tickets (IVF, 2003; MPA, 2003). Also in Western Europe, con-
sumers spend a considerable amount on home video, reaching
almost $12 billion in 2002 (IVF, 2003).
We concentrate on the Belgian market, which is represen-
tative for Western Europe in terms of various macro-economic
indicators (GDP/capita and wholesale, retail trade, restaurants
and hotels as % of GDP), and, even more importantly, on
several key characteristics of the video-rental business, such as
VCR and DVD penetration, average spending on video rental,
the average number of rental transactions per TV household,
and the average rental charge (see Table 1).
The InternationalVideoFederationestimates that thenumber
of Belgian video-rental outlets did not increase over the years
2000–2002 (IVF, 2003), supporting the notion that the market
has reached an equilibrium. Moreover, the video-rental sector is
characterized by limited entry and exit barriers (Gomery, 1993),
supporting our assumption that video stores enter as long as this
is profitable, and leave the market when they are not profitable.
4.2. Data description
4.2.1. Sample composition
Our sample consists of all active video stores in 2003 (1275
in total) in 2576 Belgian local markets. We define local markets
at the level of “townships”. Townships used to form separate
juridical entities. In the late seventies, several of them were
merged with each other to form larger “municipalities”. The
smaller level of aggregation is selected because of two reasons.
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relevant direct competition coming from outside the defined
market. Second, townships still have their own community
centre, around which several stores tend to cluster and which
people still visit for many of their day-to-day (grocery)
purchases. As customers have been found to primarily rent
their videos from a store close to their home (Zhu, 2001),
5
which reflects the typical need for local contacts in service
encounters, the smaller level of aggregation is more appropriate.
Following Asplund and Sandin (1999), we exclude all town-
ships of the largest Belgian cities from our sample. As such, we
exclude all townships of the 18 largest cities (e.g. Antwerp,
Ghent and Liege) in Belgium (i.e. 167 townships), as well as the
19 municipalities that constitute Brussels. These townships
were found to be five times larger than the rest in terms of
population, and therefore could consist of multiple local
markets. In total, we have 2390 or 93% of all townships left
for analysis, with an average population size of around 3000. To
control for potentially relevant cultural and economic differ-
ences between the two main Belgian regions, i.e. the Dutch-
speaking Northern part (Flanders) and the French-speaking
Southern part (Wallonia), we also include an additional region
dummy variable.
4.2.2. Dependent variable
Data on the number of video stores operating in each local
market(township)was obtained froma specialized dataprovider,
which derived the information primarily from the Yellow Pages.
Information from the Yellow Pages was also used to identify the
relevant stores ina trading zone by Campo etal. (2000) and Seim
(in press), among others. These data were extensively cross-
validated (and in a limited number of instances, extended) with
addresses obtained from the websites of Belgian video-store
chains, contacts with film distributors, and field research.
Summary statistics on the relative occurrence of various market
structuresaregiveninTable 2.Amajorityofthetownships(80%)
does not have a local video store, while other market structures
reflect a monopoly or duopoly situation (276 and 120 cases,
respectively). There are 40 local markets with three stores and 33
marketswithmorethanthreestores.Astherearefewobservations
withmorethanfourvideosstores,wecombinetheseobservations
in a single 4+ category. A similar practice was adopted in
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Manuszak (2002).
4.2.3. Explanatory variables
Data on the local markets' demographic characteristics was
obtained through the Belgian National Institute of Statistics
(NIS). Some of the information was only available at a higher
level of aggregation (e.g. municipality or zipcode level). In
these cases, we followed Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and
Manuszak (2002), and assigned the corresponding value to each
local market in that municipality or zipcode area.
We measure the population size of a trading zone through the
log of its number of inhabitants (in 1000). We operationalize
household size as the average number of people per household
(based on per-municipality data). Income information was
obtained from per-municipality tax-declaration data. In line
with Campo et al. (2000), we measure a market's income
distribution through two variables, capturing the percentage of
tax declarations with a low (i.e. b$13,400) and high (i.e.
N$26,800) net income. These cut-off values are driven by the
income classes reported by the Belgian NIS. Census informa-
tion is used to derive the age and ethnic composition of the
different local markets. The number of retired people is proxied
by the percentage of people older than 64 years, while the ethnic
composition ismeasured as the percentage offoreigners. We use
dummy variables to identify highly urbanized areas, and to
indicate whether the considered township is located in Flanders.
To quantify the effect of the presence of substitute channels,
two additional variables are introduced. First, we construct a
dummyvariableindicatingwhetheramovietheatreissituatedina
municipality within 7 miles of the center of the municipality to
which a given township belongs on the basis of data provided by
theNIS.Theseven-milecut-offvalueisbasedonindustryreports
which indicate that moviegoers are, on average, willing to travel
Table 1











VCR penetration (2002, % of TV households)
(b) 79% 79%
DVD-player penetration (2002, % of TV households)
(b) 17% 18%
Spending on video rental per TV household (2002, $)
(b) 21 18




Average rental charges (2002, $)
(b) 3.2 3.6
(a) United Nations Statistics.
(b) Own calculations based on numbers from the European Video Yearbook
2003, published by the International Video Federation (IVF).
(c) Following theIVF, wedefineWestern Europeas the15 countries of theEuropean
Union at the end of 2000, together with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
5 In this setting, the limited distance to a local video store is even more
relevant, as each interaction requires two contacts (renting plus returning of the
video).
Table 2
Number of observations per market structure
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6
Information on the effect of premium cable (at the zipcode level)
was only available for Wallonia, the Southern part of the country.
The variablewas operationalizedasthe percentageofhouseholds
in the zipcode with a premium-cable subscription. Data were
providedbyCanal+Wallonia,theonlyproviderofpremiumcable
in the region.
7 Summary statistics are given in Table 3.
5. Empirical results
Table4presents theparameterestimatesbasedontheordered
probit model as outlined in Section 2. Calculated Variance
Inflation Factors were all well below the critical threshold of 10,
indicating that there was no serious multicollinearity problem.
The first two columns focus on the effect of competition. In
column2,wecontrolforthepresence/absenceofamovietheatre
in the trading zone, and for the socio-demographic variables
outlined in Section 3.2.2. Both specifications are based on
the full sample, i.e. include both the region of Flanders and
Wallonia. The third column presents the results from a speci-
fication that also controls for the effect of premium cable. Since
information on premium-cable subscriptions was not available
for Flanders, the estimates in the third column are based on the
sample for Wallonia only. Table 5 subsequently presents the
estimated entry thresholds and threshold ratios implied by the
estimates of the three specifications in Table 4.
5.1. Competition
To discuss our findings on the extent of competition between
video stores in the same local market, we first discuss the results
of specification (1), which isbased on the full sample, excluding
the market-specific control variables. We subsequently address
the robustness of our findings when the effect of substitute
channels and socio-demographic information is included.
As mentioned in Section 2.2., the estimated λ
n parameters
measure the impact of competition on firm performance, and a
positive difference between λ
n and λ
n−1 can be interpreted as
evidence that entry has a negative effect on performance. The
results show that the differences are always positive. For
example, the difference between λ
n and λ
1 is 3.03−2.02=1.01.
To better interpret the parameters, we turn to the more
informative competition measures, i.e. the entry thresholds S
n
and implied entry-threshold ratios R
n, which are computed from
the λ
n; see Eqs. (6) and (7) and the earlier discussion in Section
2.2. The first panel in Table 5 shows the entry-threshold levels
S
n (computed for an average market). Specification (1) implies
that a monopolist needs a market size of approximately 5200
inhabitants to break even. The break-even market sizes for a
duopoly, and for markets with three and four or more firms are,
respectively, around 11,800, 23,400 and 38,800. This shows
that market size needs to increase disproportionally to support
an additional entry, suggesting that competition is indeed a
constraint on firm performance.
The entry-threshold ratios R
n show this more accurately. The
entry-threshold ratio for a duopoly relative to a monopoly is
equal to 1.14. In words, this says that the per-firm minimum
required market size to support a duopoly market structure is
14% larger than the market size required to support a monopoly.
The entry-threshold ratios for subsequent entry are, respective-
ly, 1.32 and 1.24: the per-firm market size should increase by an
additional 32% to support three firms, and by an additional 24%
to support four or more firms. Wald tests confirm that the ratios
are all significantly above one. Hence, we find that competition
has a significant negative effect on firm performance. For the
smaller market structures, these findings on the effects of entry
6 Results,notreportedhere,showthatthefindingsontheeffectofthepresenceof
amovietheatreholdwithdeviationsofonemileaboveandbelowthiscut-offpoint.
7 As there is only one provider of premium cable in Wallonia, offerings as
















b 19% 5% 0% 35%
Socio-demographic characteristics
Population 2390 3030 4433 14 41,481
Low income 2390 23% 4% 15% 37%
High income 2390 27% 5% 14% 42%
Household
size
2390 2.49 0.14 2.03 2.93
Age 2390 16% 3% 7% 37%






b Information on premium-cable subscriptions applies only to townships in
Wallonia. In addition, data were missing for 22 Walloon townships.
Table 4




αlog(Population) 1.23⁎⁎⁎ (0.04) 1.39⁎⁎⁎ (0.05) 1.18⁎⁎⁎ (0.07)
λ
1 2.02⁎⁎⁎ (0.07) 3.13⁎⁎⁎ (1.09) 4.85⁎⁎⁎ (1.56)
λ
2 3.03⁎⁎⁎ (0.09) 4.19⁎⁎⁎ (1.10) 5.80⁎⁎⁎ (1.56)
λ
3 3.87⁎⁎⁎ (0.11) 5.08⁎⁎⁎ (1.10) 6.65⁎⁎⁎ (1.57)
λ
4 4.49⁎⁎⁎ (0.14) 5.74⁎⁎⁎ (1.10) 7.45⁎⁎⁎ (1.58)
γTheatre – −0.17⁎⁎ (0.09) −0.16⁎ (0.13)
γPremium cable –– 1.01 (1.33)
βHousehold size – 0.78⁎⁎ (0.35) 0.72 (0.56)
βLow income – −3.58⁎⁎⁎ (1.42) −0.58 (1.83)
βHigh income – −2.10⁎⁎ (1.06) 0.20 (1.70)
βAge – 5.48⁎⁎⁎ (1.48) 8.23⁎⁎⁎ (1.99)
βEthnicity – −1.63⁎⁎ (0.70) −0.41 (1.04)
βUrbanization – 0.22⁎⁎ (0.09) 0.27⁎⁎ (0.14)
βRegion – −0.67⁎⁎⁎ (0.10) –
Pseudo R
2 0.37 0.39 0.36
Number of observations 2390 2390 1338
(a) Standard errors between parentheses. ⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎ indicate a significant
resultat,respectively,10%,5%and1% significancelevel.Reportedsignificance
tests are two-tailed, except for the effect of movie-theatre presence.
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Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). However, in contrast to these
studies, we still find threshold ratios significantly above one for
thelargermarketstructures,indicatingthatanadditionalentryin
marketswhichalreadyhavetwo orthree storesstill increasesthe
extent of competition. Unlike these studies, competition has not
yet reached perfectly competitive levels upon the fourth entry.
Our findings imply that the models of contestable markets (in
which a monopoly is sufficient for perfect competition) or of
perfectly sustainable collusion can be rejected. In addition, the
Bertrandmodelwithhomogeneousproductscanalsoberejected
(since that model would imply that all the effects of entry on
competitionwouldtakeplaceuponentryinamonopolymarket).
The observed pattern of the entry-threshold ratios gives
interesting additional findings, and underscores the value of
adopting a flexible specification on the λ
n parameters in Eq. (5).
We tested whether the consecutive per-firm entry-threshold
ratios differsignificantly from each other,i.e.whetherR
n−1=R
n.
As shown in the third panel of Table 5, the first entry-threshold
ratio R
2 is significantly smaller than R
3 (χ
2(1)=4.20, p=0.04),
implying that a shift from monopoly to duopoly has a lower
impact on competition than a shift to a market structure with
three firms. The second and third ratios do not differ
significantly from each other (χ
2(1)=0.33, p=0.57). This
pattern is inconsistent with traditional models of oligopolistic
competition, such as the Cournot model or Bertrand model with
differentiated products, which have the property of smoothly
declining entry-threshold ratios. The pattern is, however,
consistent with models with imperfectly sustainable collusion.
RecentexperimentalresearchbyHuck,Normann,andOechssler
(2004) has shown that collusion can be sustained in a duopoly,
while it is never observed in market structures with more firms.
Theyherebyconfirmthegeneralbeliefthatcooperativebehavior
could be expected in small groups, whereas in large groups non-
cooperative behavior could prevail, as cooperation is harder to
sustain as the number of firms grows. Our estimated threshold
ratiosareconsistentwiththispattern.Theentry-thresholdratiois
largest when shifting from a duopoly market to a market with
three firms (ratio=1.32). The underlying mechanism of this
finding may be that a certain degree of cooperative behavior in
the duopoly is broken down when the third firm enters the
market, causing an increase in the degree of competition. Ano-
ther possible explanation for our finding could be the existence
of two different customer types. This would imply that the first
and second entrant may largely serve different customers, while
the third may need to steal customers from both players, hence




by the entry-threshold ratiosR
n, remain very robust in the second
andthirdspecification,whichincludetheeffectofmarket-specific
control variables in, respectively, the full and limited (Wallonia
only) sample. Indeed, even though the control variables




the extent of competition, are very robust across specifications.
The threshold ratios are still significantly above one. The only
exception is the entry-threshold ratio when shifting from a
monopolytoaduopolyinthethirdspecification.Eventhoughthe
threshold is still above one (and of comparable magnitude), it no
longer reaches statistical significance. This can, however, be
attributedtothelowernumberofobservationsinthemorelimited
Wallonia sample. Furthermore, the threshold ratio for adding a
second store R
2 is significantly below the entry threshold for
adding a third store R
3 in both specifications (χ
2(1)=6.12,
p=0.01 and χ
2(1)=2.87, p=0.09 for specifications (2) and (3)
respectively). Finally, it is still the case thatR
3 is not significantly
different from R
4 (χ
2(1)=0.19, p=0 . 6 6i nb o t hc a s e s ) .
5.2. Market-specific variables
Specification (2), for the full sample, and specification (3),
for Wallonia only, include the market-specific variables outlined
in Section 3.2. As indicated before, their inclusion did not affect
our substantive implications on the nature of competition.
In line with earlier findings from the channel (e.g. Lehmann
& Weinberg, 2000) and micro-marketing literature (e.g. Campo
et al., 2000; Hoch et al., 1995), we find that both the presence of
substitute channels and various socio-demographic variables
have an important effect on store performance. Specification (2)
in Table 4 shows that the addition of these market-specific
effectsincreasesthemodelfit( pseudoR
2 of0.39insteadof0.37
in the first specification). A likelihood-ratio test shows a highly
significant joint effect of the control variables ( pb0.001).
Specification (3), for the sample of Wallonia only, again shows
that the fit increases when the control variables are included. A
likelihood-ratio test confirms that the controls are again jointly
significant (p=0.001).
8 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative
explanation.
Table 5
Estimated threshold values (S






1 5,198 4,638 4,386
S
2 11,837 9,969 9,829
S
3 23,400 18,922 20,106
S




2 1.14⁎⁎⁎ (7.29) 1.07⁎ (2.67) 1.12 (2.03)
R
3 1.32⁎⁎⁎ (17.62) 1.27⁎⁎⁎ (14.91) 1.36⁎⁎⁎ (6.87)
R





3 4.20⁎⁎ 6.12⁎⁎⁎ 2.87⁎
R
3=R
4 0.33 0.19 0.19
(a) Numbers between parentheses are the Wald test statistics for the null
hypothesis that the ratio equals one. ⁎,⁎⁎,⁎⁎⁎ indicate significant effects at the
10%, 5% and 1% level.
(b) Numbers are the Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis that two
consecutive ratios are equal to each other. ⁎,⁎⁎,⁎⁎⁎ indicate significant
differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Specification (2) in Table 4 shows that the presence of an
upward channel, i.e. a nearby movie theatre, has a signif-
icantly negative impact on the performance of video stores
(point estimate of γThreatre is −0.17, p=0.03). This result
e x t e n d sp r e v i o u sw o r kb yLehmann and Weinberg (2000).
They found cannibalization effects from earlier theatre visits
on the subsequent rental performance of the same movie. Our
results show that the cannibalization effect of movie theatres
extends beyond this direct (same-movie) effect, and affects
the overall performance of video stores in the theatre's
trading zone.
To better interpret this effect, one may compute the entry-
threshold levels S
n separately for markets with and without a
movie theatre.
9 The computations show that the market size
required to support a monopoly video store when a movie theatre
is present is equal to 4797 inhabitants as opposed to 4256 when
thisisnotthecase.Similarly,themarketsizerequiredtosupporta
duopoly when a movie theatre is present is equal to 10,309
inhabitants, and 9147 if this is not the case.
Finally, one can also re-interpret the movie-theatre parameter
γThreatre more compactly as the percentage market-size increase
requiredforaparticularnumberoffirmstobreakevenifamovie
theatre is present (independent of whether this occurs in a
monopoly, duopoly or otherwise). The parameter estimate of




Apart from an effect of upward channels, however, a video
store may also be affected by channels more downward in the
distribution channel, as discussed in Section 3.2.1. We as-
sessed the impact of premium cable on video-store perfor-
mance using the Wallonia sample only (n=1338), since data
on the number of subscriptions to premium cable was only
available for this region. The third specification in Tables 4
and 5 shows the results. As indicated before, the substantive
results on competition are essentially robust. For the role of
the downward channel, we look at the parameter estimate for
premium cable. We find that the percentage of households
with a subscription to premium cable does not have a sig-
nificant effect on the performance of video stores (point
estimate of 1.01, p=0.45). Hence, there appears to be no
cannibalization by the downward distribution channel, in
contrast with our finding on the upward distribution channel.
The absence of an effect from the downstream channel (pre-
mium cable) shows that customers do not postpone their
purchase in anticipation of a price decrease, as was suggested
by Purohit (1997).T h i si sar e a s s u r i n gf i n d i n gf o rm o v i e
studios, as their margin is largest for channels highest in the
sequence (Doyle, 2002).
5.2.2. Socio-demographic variables
Specification (2), for the full sample, and specification (3),
for Wallonia only, include socio-demographic variables. As
indicated before, their inclusion did not affect our substantive
implications on the nature of competition.
We base our discussion regarding the socio-demographic
variables on specification (2).
11 The effect of income appears to
be dual. Both markets with many low-income families and
markets with many high-income families are associated with a
significantly lower video-store performance, as compared to
markets with more intermediate-income families (p=0.01 and
0.05, respectively). For families at the lower tail of the income
distribution, the traditional income effect may hold: they may
have to cut back on entertainment and spend their income on
necessary goods. For the higher incomes, the substitution effect
comes into play. They may spend their budget on more
expensive forms of entertainment. The latter finding is in line
with recent industry reports that conclude that high-income
segments have a lower propensity to rent videos (VSDA, 1998).
Larger families appear to spend more on video rental (p=0.03).
As larger families are typically families with children, this result
is consistent with industry reports that found that families with
children rent far more videos than other households (VSDA,
1998). The percentage of foreigners in a market has a negative
influence on video-store profit (p=0.02). This confirms our
prior argumentation that foreigners may face economic, cultural
or linguistic barriers that prevent them from renting videos.
Elderly increases the profitability of a video store, as is
indicated by the significant positive effect of the percentage of
older people (pb0.001), which may be explained by their
typically larger amount of leisure time (Vogel, 2001). In line
with the findings of industry reports (VSDA, 1998), people in
urban surroundings rent more videos, thereby increasing
video-store profitability (p=0.02). Finally, also regional
differences turn out to be important, as the parameter associated
with this control variable was highly significant (pb0.001).
6. Conclusions and directions for future research
Local-service sectors have been largely neglected in the
widely-studied field of competitive interactions. This may be
attributed to the fact that detailed data gathering in these sectors
is typically difficult because of the multitude of players, and the
fact that key service components are hard to quantify. An
empirical entry model is proposed to study competition in local-
service sectors by inferring information on the profitability and
the degree of competition from observed entry decisions of
firms in local markets. This approach, which imposes very few
data demands, does not only allow us to infer information on the
relative degree of competition in different market structures, but
9 OurestimatesofthresholdvaluesS
ninTable5werebasedonarepresentative
average market, with an average movie-theatre presence equal to 0.72. Our
calculations in this paragraph separately distinguish between markets with and
without a movie theatre.
10 This can be derived by computing the ratio of threshold values S
n with and
without a movie theatre. It is straightforward to derive that this ratio is given by
exp(−γ ˆ /α ˆ)=exp(0.17/1.39)=1.13.
11 Most of these findings are robust when only the results for the limited
sample of Wallonia are considered, even though some of the demographic
effects become insignificant due to the reduced number of observations.
Specifically, the effect of age and the degree of urbanization remain significant,
while both the effects of household size and the percentage of foreigners are
comparable in sign and size to the results from the larger sample.
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channels, as well as of various socio-demographic factors.
InourapplicationontheBelgianvideo-rentalmarket,wefind
that competition increases with every entry, including when
entry occurs in a duopoly and a market with three incumbents.
However, contrary to predictions from most traditional eco-
nomic models, we find that this increase is larger when entry
occurs in a duopoly than in a monopoly. The observed pattern is
consistent, however, with recent experimental research on
collusion in oligopolies by Huck et al. (2004). It could also
point at the existence of two customer groups served by,
respectively, the first and second entrant. More research is
needed to distinguish between both explanations.
We also find evidence for a negative effect of the presence of
anupstreamchannel(movietheatre).Premiumcable,ontheother
hand, does not impact video-store performance significantly. In
line with the micro-marketing literature, we also find that socio-
demographiccharacteristicsofthelocalmarkethaveanimportant
effect on store performance. Specifically, we find that the
percentage of both low-income and high-income families have
anegativeeffectonvideo-storeperformance.Alsothepercentage
of foreigners was found to influence video-store performance
negatively.Largerfamiliesandfamiliesinurbansurroundings,on
the other hand, are found to rent more movies.
Our framework allows us toinfer the nature of competition in
local-service markets without very stringent data requirements.
In so doing, some assumptions were made which could be
relaxedinfutureresearch.First,asindicatedinSection2.1,firms
in a given market are assumed to be homogeneous. Despite the
fact that video stores offer a relatively homogeneous product,
store organization as well as economies of scale in inventory
management and/or advertising could result in different demand
and cost structures between independent and chain-affiliated
video stores (Seim, 2001). However, our homogeneity assump-
tion may still be valid in most European countries where video
chains are limited in size (number of stores). In Belgium, for
example, the largest chain has only 60 stores, which is hardly
comparable to American chains as Blockbusters and Hollywood
Entertainment with, respectively, 5000 and 1800 video stores
(Seim, 2001). We tested the robustness of our substantive results
on competition by dropping all markets where at least one of the
major chains is present. The results turned out to be robust. Still,
moreresearchisneededtorelaxthisassumptionwhenchainsget
larger. In principle, one could follow the approach of Mazzeo
(2002), and explicitly account for different types of video stores
(independent versus chain-affiliated stores). For this particular
application, however, this did not provide a feasible option, as
very few stores belong to a chain (only 8% of all Belgian video
stores). This would imply very limited variation across different
market-structure combinations (as defined by the number of
stores of each type).
Second, the various markets in our sample are assumed to be
non-overlapping. To that extent, we omitted larger cities from
our sample, and focused on townships, rather than the larger
municipalities, as relevant geographical entity. However, some
overlap may still exist in a number of instances, for example,
when transient shoppers patronize video stores on their route to
work rather than in their home's township. To mitigate this
effect, one could follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and
include socio-demographic characteristics of the neighboring
townships as additional control variables in Eq. (5). Alterna-
tively, one could follow Seim (in press), and start from a larger
market definition which is subsequently divided into multiple
townships. This would provide insights on the extent to which
competition decreases when the distance between townships
becomes larger. It would be especially interesting to see whether
the rate of decline with distance, as found by Seim, is different
for competition between video stores themselves than for
competition between the video stores and, respectively, the
upward and downward competing channels. Integrating this in
her framework could offer interesting new insights. However,
since our results indicate that competition between video store
themselves is not linear, this would be computationally very
burdensome (see Seim's discussion in her Section 2.2).
Third, as the data used in this analysis are cross-sectional, we
could not control for unobserved market-specific effects. We did,
however, perform additional robustness checks on this matter,
adding(i)anumberofextrasocio-demographicvariables,and(ii)
fixed effects for the 10Belgian provinces.The substantive results
on competition were robust. Studying these effects with panel
data could provide interesting further insights.
Fourth, the nature of competition is inferred under a long-
term free entry equilibrium condition. This assumption is
reasonable for mature industries such as the video-rental sector.
Infutureresearch,itwouldbeinterestingtoextend themodeling
approachto consider the dynamics underlying the entry process.
A final avenue for future research involves the application of
our framework to other countries and/or other local-service
sectors (such as restaurants and hotels), which would allow one
to see whether some of our substantive implications on the
nature of competition and the effects of the included control
variables are idiosyncratic to this specific setting, or form the
onset of empirical generalizations.
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